Pausing the Permanent Joint Board on Defense Sends a Message — But Its an Intentionally Muddled One

Today, the United States’ Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Elbridge Colby, announced that the Department of Defence “is pausing the Permanent Joint Board on Defense to reassess how this forum benefits shared North American defense.” This should be seen as a significant signal to Canada, though what it’s specifically intended to get Canada to do isn’t clear — probably intentionally.

The Permanent Joint Board on Defense has been regularly meeting since 1940. It’s a less formal meeting between senior working-level civilian and military officials, as well as invited advisors, which can discuss any topic related to the defence of either country that either party may wish to raise — giving it a wide brief. In practical terms, it’s been used “to exchange views of a politically sensitive nature” and “its key role is to help the two nations to develop common understanding and workable approaches to continental defence challenges as well as global security threats with a North American nexus”, in recent years. At least, that’s how a report by the Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba described the findings of a 2020 meeting that discussed the past, present, and future of the Board on its 80th anniversary.

According to Wikipedia, the board meets semi-annually (twice per year), however the source for that appears to be a backgrounder released by the government in 2001. In more recent times, it’s met once per year, including in June 2019, June 2021 (with 2020 skipped, perhaps due to COVID or because that year’s 80th anniversary discussion was deemed sufficient), October 2022, October 2023, and November 2024. Each of these meetings was numbered, meaning that list is complete during those years.

However, while it’s relatively easy to find press releases or other information related to all of these meetings, there are no indications that the Board has met since Donald Trump returned to office in 2025. It’s not impossible that a change in policy — perhaps tied to Trump’s return — has led to a decision to no longer publicize anything about these meetings. But the 2019 meeting, held during Trump’s first term, was documented, which would make that a new approach. The more likely explanation is that the meeting expected in 2025 simply didn’t occur — implying there may have been a de facto “pause” even before today’s announcement.

What’s striking is that Colby’s justification rests on the claim that “Canada has failed to make credible progress on its defense commitments,” alongside the assertion that “a strong Canada that prioritizes hard power over rhetoric benefits us all.” Taken at face value, pausing the Permanent Joint Board on Defense is a counter-intuitive response, given that balancing each country’s contributions to mutual defence is one of the Board’s most consistent and well-established functions.

A more plausible explanation is that this fits a familiar pattern in how Donald Trump, and now his Administration, apply pressure: identify a grievance without offering a clear solution, generate headlines, and wait for the other party to act pre-emptively in an attempt to defuse the conflict. The outcome is that Trump gets something he wants, or at least that the other party thinks he wants, without giving up anything. The follow-through is that the US then completely ignores the offered appeasement, continues its criticism, sometimes getting additional concessions, and then eventually enters into negotiations with the other side in an already weakened position.

Canada saw this dynamic at the start of Trump’s second term, when tariff threats were tied to concerns about border security. Never mind that only 1.3% of illegal immigrant interceptions and 0.2% of fentanyl seizures — the claimed irritants — were occurring at the Canadian border, Canada still moved quickly to increase border security spending and capabilities. Those efforts received no acknowledgement from the incoming Administration. The criticism continued without any acknowledgement of the investment, eventually shifting toward more politically potent — if equally unfounded — claims about trade practices.

In many ways, Canada is already caught in this cycle when it comes to defence. In the first year of Trump’s second term, Canada increased defence spending by over 40% year-over-year. It has committed to increasing spending to 2.5 times the 2024 level within a decade, on top of a 40% increase over the previous decade. The four largest defence projects in Canadian history — a new fighter fleet, a more capable class of warship, NORAD modernization, and a significantly expanded submarine capability — are not only proceeding simultaneously, but are now moving at a pace few other nations’ defence establishments could match, even accounting for past delays. Alongside these are numerous “smaller” (though still substantial) efforts: rifles, air defence, HIMARS, helicopters, corvettes, replenishment ships, AEW&C, aerial refuelling, cyber capabilities, and drones of all kinds, just to scratch the surface. Canada is even developing a Reserve force expansion that could potentially quadruple total CAF manpower.

And the US Administration’s response to this is… zero acknowledgement. Just the exact the critique we would expect, and in fact received, before any of these projects or programs — with the “pause” of a long-standing Board to emphasize the point. But, what point?

No one could credibly claim Canada’s significant increases in defence investment are happening flawlessly — particularly if one’s interest is in how they serve America, rather than Canadian, priorities. Some level and amount of criticism is fair and reasonable. But if America wants to influence Canada’s decisions within those investments, acknowledging that those investments are happening is a pre-requisite. And history shows that the Permanent Joint Board on Defense has been an effective venue for exactly that kind of engagement.

If the US Administration has a specific aim from this action, it’s just as likely to be related to the upcoming CUSMA trade discussions as about defence. More likely, though, the goal is simply to induce unilateral concessions from Canada, without much regard for their substance. Whatever Canada offers in response, it can be confident of one thing: it will not reduce future demands, and once given, it will not be available in subsequent negotiations. The U.S. may escalate if Canada does nothing — but it may do so regardless.

In the end, this decision will likely be a relatively minor element of the broader strain Donald Trump has introduced into Canada–U.S. relations. The Permanent Joint Board on Defense matters, but as a senior advisory body, its absence will not produce immediate negative consequences at the operational level and, notwithstanding damaged relationships, can easily be restarted. If the objective is to extract one-sided concessions, this is, by comparison to other available tools, almost a restrained approach.

From the Canadian government’s perspective, there is even a limited silver lining. For as long as the pause lasts, it provides political cover for defence decisions that might otherwise draw U.S. criticism. It’s easy to imagine Prime Minister Carney responding to such objections with a deadpan: “Canada’s government will always prioritize the defence of Canada. We recognize the United States has concerns, and that we share an interest in the defence of North America. But as they made the unilateral decision to step away from the Permanent Joint Board on Defense — the forum where we addressed these issues for over 85 years — it is more difficult to incorporate their views.” It would play well domestically. It also has the virtue, and curse, of being true.

Because ultimately, that is the risk of the approach America is taking to its relationship with Canada. If every concession is met with silence, and every effort is treated as insufficient, then there’s no incentive to cooperate except when it benefits Canada without anything in return. The Permanent Joint Board on Defense was built upon the same assumption all of Canada and America’s cooperation is built upon — that both countries benefit from sustained, good-faith engagement. Pausing it doesn’t just test that assumption — it undermines it.

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